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This article reviews the law relating to the defence of reasonable chastisement in the UK, analysing the
impact of European and international jurisprudence thereon.
I Introduction
The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has consistently advocated removing from national laws any
right physically to chastise children. Partially in light thereof, the June 2003 reports of the Commons Select
Committee on Health and the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights recommended abolishing the
defence of reasonable chastisement within England. However, the subsequent Green Paper published by
the government ignored these recommendations, failing to address the issue.1
This article will review the law in the area, analysing the impact of European and international jurisprudence
thereon. Although England is the principal focus of this article, comparisons with other jurisdictions (primarily
in the UK) facilitate a critical appraisal of the salient laws. The limitations on the exercise of the defence
which have been developed to date will be considered, before an analysis of the mounting national and
international pressure is provided. Factors influencing policy in the UK will be considered before conclusions
are drawn.
First, it is intended to place the contemporary debate in its historical context by setting out below a brief
precis of the evolution of the defence of reasonable chastisement, the invocation of which exonerates the
perpetrator from what would otherwise be an assault on a minor.
II Reasonable chastisement as a defence
There is nothing novel in national law permitting the physical chastisement of children. Laws concerning
physical chastisement used to be considerably broader, with wives and, earlier, servants and slaves, being
subjected to legitimate physical abuse. Of course now slavery is proscribed and women have acquired rights
giving them equal status to that of men. Domestic violence is subject to criminal law, with no 'reasonable
chastisement' defence. The legal treatment of assaults on children, however, has merely been modified.
Support for the right of parents to chastise their children can be found in a number of ancient religious texts.
Pertinently, given England's legal history, the Bible, Proverbs 13, verse 24, states that 'he that spareth his
rod hateth his son'. Centuries later, this passage is still reflected in the common law. Although children are no
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longer regarded as the property of their parents, they lack the legal status enjoyed by adults. By necessity,
children do not enjoy full legal rights from birth. Rather they have evolving rights in accordance with their
mental capacity, age and maturity. Parents and guardians have legal responsibility for their children's care
and upbringing and, in furtherance thereof, exercise reasonable disciplinary functions. Children are thus
subject to control by their parents or primary carers and, in their weaker legal position, they are inherently
vulnerable to abuse.
A right to discipline a child is a fundamental parental right benefiting both the parent and the child, when
exercised appropriately. Polarisation of societal attitudes arises when the discipline dispensed is corporal in
nature. Although there are criminal sanctions for physical punishment,2 those exercising parental rights may
rely on the defence of reasonable chastisement.3 Traditionally, similar approaches are taken elsewhere in
the UK and, indeed, the world. For example, in Scotland, the traditional right of a parent to chastise his or her
child is discussed by the institutional writers4 and in recent case-law.5 In the seminal English case of R v
Hopley,6 Chief Justice Cockburn reflected upon the common law position: moderate and reasonable
chastisement may be used to correct what is evil in a child but such punishment should be neither excessive
nor protracted.7 One hundred and thirty-five years later, the Law Commission's consultation paper, Consent
in the Criminal Law, upheld this position, concluding that 'unless any particular technical difficulty is brought
to our notice in relation to this common law defence as it now stands, we are likely to have no
recommendations for law reform to make in this regard'.8 This statement followed a comprehensive
comparative review of salient provisions.
It is evident that parents retain a prima facie right to use appropriate physical punishment as a method of
disciplining their children. However, although the existence and continuance of a parent's right to discipline
his or her child has not been questioned, the very scope of the defence of reasonable chastisement has
been increasingly subject to review.
III Limiting the scope of the defence
From its inception, the defence of reasonable chastisement has not been unfettered. Limitations have been
imposed by courts upholding the common law. More recently, essentially in response to international
developments, further reforms have been introduced through statutory intervention.
In respect of the common law, factors were identified in the nineteenth century as limiting the
reasonableness of chastisement. These included situations when punishment was administered 'for the
gratification of passion or of rage', the excessive duration of the punishment, and the use (if at all) of
implements.9 This guidance has stood the test of time. Given this common law position, the jurisprudence of
the European Court of Human Rights and European Commission of Human Rights has been particularly
instrumental in prompting revision of the law. Limitations have emerged in two areas: punishment of children
by their parents and by third parties. Progress on the latter has been significant.
A Punishment of children by third parties
Judicial corporal punishment in the Isle of Man prompted the initial examination in Tyrer v United Kingdom10
of corporal punishment under the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms 1950 (European Convention). Three strokes of the birch was imposed as a
sentence on a 15-year-old boy convicted of assault occasioning actual bodily harm. According to the
European Court of Human Rights (European Court), such judicial corporal punishment amounted to
institutional violence,11 and thus an assault on Tyrer's dignity and physical integrity. Having regard to the
surrounding factors, an infringement of Article 3 of the European Convention was upheld by the European
Court, following the opinion of the European Commission. The court identified a number of factors to be
considered when determining the effect of any given incidence of physical punishment, including the nature
and context of the punishment, the method of its execution and the personal characteristics of the victim.
These factors proved instrumental in settling future complaints. After the Tyrer decision, other 'institutional'
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settings have been examined by the European Court for compatibility with Article 3 of the European
Convention. Corporal punishment in state schools was questioned in the Scottish case of Campbell and
Cosans v UK,12 the use of the 'tawse'13 being in point. Although the court concluded that the level of
humiliation and degradation experienced by potential recipients was insufficient to infringe Article 3, section
47 of the Education (No 2) Act 1986 soon afterwards removed the right of teachers in state schools in
England and Wales14 to chastise physically children. Following the case of Costello-Roberts v United
Kingdom,15 the legislators' attention turned to private schools, with section 131 of the School Standards and
Framework Act 199816 extending the prohibition to all schools. Again, no actual violation of Article 3 had
been found by the European Commission or European Court in that case, the meted punishment not
reaching the required threshold of severity.
Limiting the application of the defence has been an incremental process. Following proscription in schools,
the National Assembly for Wales proceeded to adopt regulations prohibiting corporal punishment in all forms
of day care.17 This was followed in England. After the biennial review of the professional standards of
childminders, the Department for Education and Skills announced that, from autumn 2003, childminders and
those with responsibility for day-care provision (for children under 8 years) would be precluded from using
physical chastisement.18 This revision to the national guidelines operates irrespective of parental consent
thereto, standardising the legal position of childminders, nursery staff and teachers. Interestingly this move
signifies a reversal of government policy, following 2 years of intensive lobbying to reverse the decision of
the then Secretary of State for Education (David Blunkett) that childminders should continue to be allowed to
administer corporal punishment in accordance with parental wishes.19 Today the situation is clear: any
physical assault on children under eight in regulated day care may not be justified by raising the defence of
unreasonable chastisement.
B Punishment of children by their parents
With the law clarified through statutory provisions limiting the use of physical punishment in regulated
settings, it was inevitable that a complaint would eventually be brought before the European Court which
focused on discipline within the home. The seminal case is that of A v United Kingdom,20 which concerned
the acquital of a stepfather charged with assault of a 9-year-old boy. The boy sustained severe bruising and
markings which lasted several days from beatings with a cane, although the jury accepted the stepfather's
defence of reasonable chastisement. The court considered that the UK had infringed its obligations under
Article 1 of the European Convention by failing to ensure the criminal law applied to a perpetrator of
treatment which infringed Article 3 of the European Convention. The factors identified as being indicative of
an unacceptable level of punishment reflected previous jurisprudence: the age, health and size of the child,
the nature and duration of the punishment, and the lasting physical or psychological effect.21 Note that the
European Court did not advocate banning all corporal punishment by parents; its judgment was restricted to
ensuring that excessive use of punishment - beating, rather than 'careful chastisement' - was caught under
the criminal law.22 In other words the State was merely required to discharge its positive obligation to protect
individuals from treatment of a severity which infringed Article 3.
Not surprisingly, the combination of A v UK and the imminent entry into force of the Human Rights Act 1998
(HRA 1998) ensured a high public profile for this area of the law. Public consultations in all UK jurisdictions
ensued. Within England, Protecting Children, Supporting Parents - A Consultation Document on the Physical
Punishment of Children23 proposed legislation clarifying the limits of the defence of reasonable
chastisement.24 The consultation exercise was shaped by the view that 'we do not consider that the right
way forward is to make unlawful all smacking and other forms of physical rebuke ... this [consultation] paper
explicitly rules out this possibility'.25 Indeed, following a brief resumé of European countries, the government
view was that 'it would be quite unacceptable to outlaw all physical punishment of a child by a parent'.26 Its
approach was essentially to propose legislation reiterating the factors considered relevant by the European
Court in A v United Kingdom. Additional options were also proposed, including expanding the determinant
factors (for example specifying circumstances in which the defence should not operate),27 removing the
defence from all but common assault charges28 and further restricting those who could claim the defence of
reasonable chastisement.29 In contrast, the contemporaneous Scottish and subsequent Northern Irish
consultations additionally proposed removing the equivalent defence entirely, thereby leaving anyone
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physically chastising a child liable for assault charges.30 The Northern Irish document also mooted enacting
a statement of principle.31
In 2001, the English Government started from the premise that it was 'obliged to change UK law in a way
which takes account of the court's judgment' in A v United Kingdom32 and that the government fully
accepted the need for change.33 Nevertheless, after analysing the responses to the consultation document,
the government later concluded that there was no need for any change since the entry into force of the HRA
1998 meant that any court considering a case involving reasonable chastisement as a defence would be
required by section 3 to take into account the guidance provided by the European Court in A v United
Kingdom.34 This conclusion is surprising considering that the analysis of responses records 'clear support
for the premise that it can never be reasonable to cause a head injury through disciplining a child'.35 A broad
consensus of opinion indicated that injuries more serious than those causing red marks of bruises of a few
days' duration, injuries to the head and harsh physical injuries (biting, shaking, burning, kicking) were in
themselves unacceptable and outwith the terms of reasonableness.36 Given such recorded consensus on
the outer limits of permissible punishment and the agreed need to protect children from harm, it is
extraordinary that the government's professed commitment to 'improving safeguards for children'37 resulted
in a decision to leave English law unchanged.
The government had undertaken its consultation exercise at a time when the HRA 1998 was already
enacted, albeit not fully in force. Despite the Act's imminent implementation, the government then considered
that legislative change would still be needed. Its subsequent change of heart appears to have been
influenced by the decision of the Court of Appeal Criminal Division in R v H (Assault of Child: Reasonable
Chastisement) [2001] EWCA Crim 1024.38 This was a Crown appeal occasioned by judicial reluctance to
direct a jury to apply the defence of reasonable chastisement incorporating the A v UK criteria.39 The trial
judge was uncertain over the extent to which the HRA 1998 and A v UK had modified the scope and
definition of the defence and the propriety of directing the jury towards a modified version of the old common
law defence, in accordance therewith. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Court of Criminal Appeal upheld the
appeal, noting that common law is evolutionary and that directing a jury in accordance with the
aforementioned criteria is 'an appropriate and accurate reflection of the current state of the common law in
the light of the Strasbourg jurisprudence to which the English courts, by virtue of the HRA 1998, must now
have regard'.40 It should be noted, that although including the relevant factors listed by the European Court
in A v UK, an additional factor was now suggested, that of motive. In neither A v UK nor any other salient
case has the 'reasons given by the defendant for administering punishment' been referred to by the
European Court as a pertinent factor. Indeed, as the Northern Irish Office of Law Reform commented in its
consultation paper, the additional factor identified in R v H 'places a gloss on the A v UK factors which
changes their meaning'.41 Article 3 of the European Convention is itself non-derogable, thus it is not possible
for the law to be applied by the domestic courts to permit an individual a potentially wider margin of discretion
regarding the circumstances in which criminal responsibility may be avoided than those set out by the
European Court itself.
The dicta of the European Court in A v UK42 made it clear that the government had overall responsibility for
ensuring that the rights and freedoms of individuals were not infringed. But, the State cannot absolve itself of
its responsibilities under Article 1 of the European Convention by simply passing the 'buck' to the courts. It
can be seen that although invoking the HRA 1998 in such situations may appear to be in accordance with
the letter of the law, it leaves considerable discretion to the courts and judges and juries. In particular,
reliance on a jury for the final evaluation, on the basis of set criteria, risks a jury acquitting a defendant in
circumstances which the European Court may still consider to be inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment. Rogers is therefore of the opinion that the government should not be complacent.43 A direction
merely pointing out relevant factors in assessing the reasonableness of the treatment will not, per se,
produce appropriate acquittals in all cases. Instead, Rogers proposes that the judge should direct the jury on
the basis of his or her evaluation of the facts. In other words, the evaluative decision as to the
reasonableness of the treatment should not be left to the jury. Perhaps some support for this can be drawn
from Rose LJ's dictum in R v H, alluding to the continuous development of the common law. In complying
with section 3 of the HRA 1998, judges could potentially erode the scope of the defence over the years, in
accordance with the evolving standards emerging from the jurisprudence of the European Court.44 The fact
remains that the criteria mentioned in R v H potentially permit acquittals in circumstances falling within Article
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3 of the European Convention. Although as a stopgap measure, the present approach may have some
superficial appeal, as the analyses of Rogers and the Northern Irish Office of Law Reform suggest, it is
hardly a foolproof method. Indeed, arguably the government's assertion that this approach satisfactorily
reconciles the current law with the European Convention is fundamentally flawed. Moreover, the Committee
of Ministers of the Council of Europe is not yet satisfied that this is an appropriate response to A v United
Kingdom.45
IV Mounting pressure for change
Calls for reform of the law in this area have been increasingly vocal over the last few years, gathering
momentum and support. Both international and national pressure is being exerted on the government. Many
legal commentators note that removal of the defence of reasonable chastisement and/or outlawing physical
chastisement of children is essential to bring English, and indeed Scots, law into conformity with international
obligations.46
A International pressure
From a human rights perspective, the evolution of societal attitudes towards corporal punishment of children
reflects the evolution of international human rights themselves. The UN Convention on the Rights of the
Child 1989, a comparatively recent treaty, specifically requires that the State takes all appropriate measures
to protect the child from all forms of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse.47 Many other earlier
international human rights treaties, however, focus on protecting the individual from the abusive use of power
by the State. Nevertheless, in the case of the chastisement of children, the State's obligation has been
interpreted as having an element of horizontal effect. Thus, in the context of the European Convention, a
State must ensure that (in this instance) criminal law adequately protects individuals from each other by
punishing those perpetrating treatment which violates the European Convention.48 Through developing the
positive obligation on States and the human rights' standard, treaty-monitoring bodies have inferred a
prohibition on corporal punishment. For example, in Europe, the European Committee of Social Rights
(European Committee) (which supervises the implementation of the European Social Charter) opined in an
observation on corporal punishment that 'Article 17 requires a prohibition in legislation against any form of
violence against children, whether at school, in other institutions, in their home or elsewhere'.49 The lack of
such a prohibition in, inter alia, the UK was viewed critically in recent reports - the European Committee
requested further information on the government's intentions and the position pertaining in Scotland and
Northern Ireland. The Committee took account of the work of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,
which had commented on the subject in many of its concluding observations. Indeed, when responding to
the UK's two periodic reports, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has criticised the reasonable
chastisement defence. Most recently in 2002, the UN Committee recommended that 'with urgency' the UK
should adopt legislation throughout its jurisdictions to 'remove the "reasonable chastisement" defence and
prohibit all corporal punishment in the family and in any other contexts not covered by existing legislation'.50
If the government wishes to avoid further international criticism, additional change will be required before the
third periodic report is submitted.
Other instruments are also relevant. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 has been
interpreted to prohibit excessive corporal punishment, the salient provision prohibiting torture and cruel
treatment or punishment of children and pupils.51 There is, however, little to suggest that an outright ban is
advocated by the Human Rights Committee (the covenant's principal monitoring body). In contrast, the
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which oversees the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966, has drawn support for such a prohibition from the basic
principles of the dignity of the individual which underpin all such instruments. In its concluding observations
on the latest report of the UK, the committee recommended that 'the physical punishment of children in
families be prohibited'.52
International pressure mounts as ever more States enact criminal legislation prohibiting all physical
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chastisement. Within Europe, and indeed further afield, many countries now proscribe physical chastisement
of children. Sweden led the way in 1979 (the International Year of the Child), enacting a prohibition on
physical punishment of children. The other Nordic States followed suit in the 1980s (Finland, Denmark and
Norway), with the relevant Icelandic law entering into force in November 2003. Germany, Latvia, Cyprus,
Austria and Croatia have also enacted prohibitions. Yet more States have developed the defence of
reasonable chastisement and/or existing criminal law through legislation and/or jurisprudence, while other
States have conducted, or are in the process of undertaking, consultations on corporal punishment.
A key element in the successful implementation of restrictions on physical chastisement of children has been
comprehensive education programmes. Many countries which have not yet proscribed the physical
chastisement of children have successfully effected attitudinal change53 which, in itself, must be regarded as
a positive steps as well as a potential precursor to legislation. The trend towards abolition of corporal
punishment reflects the work of international and regional human rights monitoring bodies promulgating
progressive changes in national laws.
B National pressure
Alongside emergent international pressure, the UK Government is facing growing national pressure. Recent
reports of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights and the House of Common Health
Committee advocated abolition of the defence of reasonable chastisement. These reports contrast starkly
with the government's own view that an outright ban on parental chastisement would be unacceptable.54
The Joint Committee on Human Rights reviewed the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989, the
reports of the UK to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child and that committee's concluding
observations thereon.55 Given that two successive concluding observations of the UN Committee had
highlighted the problems inherent in the application of the reasonable chastisement defence, the Joint
Committee was bound to consider the matter in detail. It noted that imprecision in 'reasonable chastisement'
and its very retention have been condemned by the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, while the
government has consistently maintained that application of the existing law is sufficient to combat child
abuse. A number of examples of 'improper' use of the reasonable chastisement defence were highlighted by
the Joint Committee,56 as was the potential link57 between chastisement and abuse (through a gradual
escalation of violence). Having considered considerable evidence from interested parties, the Joint
Committee concluded that 'the lack of respect [the defence of reasonable chastisement] embodies for
children's entitlement to be free from physical assault [is] unacceptable'.58 It therefore recommended that the
government review its obligations under the Convention in order to bring practice into line therewith.59
Meanwhile, the House of Commons Health Committee60 was contemporaneously considering the report of
the Victoria Climbié inquiry.61 The Committee noted that '[w]hat happened to Victoria involved the apparent
escalation of discipline and punishment', and urged the government to use its forthcoming Green Paper on
children at risk to 'remove the increasingly anomalous reasonable chastisement defence from parents and
carers in order to fully protect children from injury and death'.62 Regrettably Every Child Matters, the
government's Green Paper response to the Climbié inquiry, was published in September 2003,63 with no
mention of the reasonable chastisement defence. Nevertheless, the focus on children's services and the
mechanics of system protection heralds a major shake up of child protection provision in England and it is
not possible to predict what amendments may yet be made to the new Children Bill.64
Given the alleged human rights based foreign policy agenda advocated by the government65 and the
allegedly moral stand adopted on many global issues, such inaction is remarkable. The fact that two
prominent parliamentary committees recently derided the status quo is not something which should be
ignored by the government. Given the growing support for reform of the law, it should perhaps reconsider its
options, but, as discussed below, the government may consider there to be good political reasons for not
altering the status quo.
V Additional policy factors
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While international human rights bodies favour the abolition of corporal punishment, there are clearly a
number of factors influencing national policy and law. In the first place, the government is wary of courting
public disapproval. In its Analysis of Responses, the government stated 'we do not believe that any further
change to the law at this time would command widespread public support or ... be capable of consistent
enforcement'.66 Lack of popular support may be attributable to the government's failure to educate parents
over alternative forms of punishment. Undoubtedly public attitudes towards corporal punishment of children
have evolved in recent years,67 which should have encouraged a more positive governmental response.
Public opinion responds to information programmes; thus clearly some sort of education strategy is an
essential prerequisite to any reform of the law. The Irish Law Commission highlighted the role of education in
its 1994 report on the subject. Following the Swedish model, it advocated a programme of re-education in
support of non-physical forms of discipline as a preliminary step towards abolition of parental rights of
corporal punishment.68 The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child recommended that the UK 'promote
positive, participatory and non-violent forms of discipline ... and carry out public education programmes on
the negative consequences of corporal punishment'.69 A comprehensive, near saturation education
programme eased the introduction of the Swedish legislation prohibiting corporal punishment and other
humiliating treatment, the world's first such initiative, in 1979.70 Indeed the Swedish initiative was primarily
intended to be educational rather than punitive.71 Explanatory leaflets were delivered to all households, a
series of advertisements were broadcast on television and even milk cartons were emblazoned with
supporting information. Aided by the high literacy rate and progressive nature of Swedish society, the new
law can be judged a success: in the last 20 years, Sweden has witnessed few prosecutions for child
chastisement and improved abuse statistics.72 That the message was conveyed lucidly and explained in
detail is surely a contributing factor.73
There is clearly also a precedent for advertising designed to influence public attitudes in the UK . The
HIV/AIDS advertisements of the 1980s and the ongoing anti-smoking campaign are two examples. Within
Scotland, the Health Education Board funds an even higher proportion of advertisements.74 More generally,
organisations such as Save the Children, Children First and the single issue non-government organisation
amalgamation, Children are Unbeatable, have produced an array of literature aimed at informing and
shaping public opinion. An education programme is an essential, yet feasible, pre-requisite to a successful
change in the law.
Amongst other factors, the government clearly fears a spate of frivolous prosecutions; these would obviously
exacerbate public disapproval. As is acknowledged in many responses to the consultation documents and
other sources, any reform of the law must take into account the right of parents physically to restrain children
in certain situations, for example to prevent them harming themselves.75 Obviously, such restraint should
not ipso facto be prosecuted as an assault, if the force used had been confined to what was strictly
necessary in the circumstances. Significantly, the common law defence existed originally to enable parents
and other carers to discharge their protective duties without fear of legal challenge. On this point, the Joint
Committee on Human Rights noted that in the event of any wholesale repeal of the reasonable chastisement
defence, '[I]t would then be necessary to rely on current prosecution policy ... to ensure that mild smacks of
children, like minor assaults on adults, would not be prosecuted'.76 However, the government, in its
consultation paper, noted that 'there could be no guarantee that there would not be charges of assault
brought in relation to minor cases'.77 Obviously the decision as to whether to bring a prosecution will rest
with the Crown Prosecution Service, as is already the case for other prosecutions, with the facts as
presented being the determining factor. Perhaps some safeguards could be incorporated from other
successful models. For example, the Swedish education model includes information on circumstances in
which children can be restrained without recourse to prosecution.78
The government might also be influenced by the difficulties experienced by those seeking to reform the law
in Scotland. The Scottish Parliament (before its 2003 pre-election dissolution) considered a Bill limiting the
defence of reasonable chastisement and removing its use for children under three completely. Such a
proposal was controversial and, indeed, highly problematic. The proposed clause drew on the work of the
Scottish Law Commission79 which had recommended removing from the ambit of the defence striking a
child 'with a stick, belt or other object; or ... in such a way as to cause, or to risk causing, injury; or ... in such
a way as to cause, or to risk causing, pain or discomfort lasting more than a very short time'.80 Even more
controversial was the age proposal: the country was polarised on whether to outlaw physical chastisement of
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very young children. The uncertainty of the parameters between appropriate restraint and inappropriate
punishment caused concern, with proponents arguing strongly in support of 'loving smacks', controlled and
limited physical punishment. It was also feared that the Scottish proposals might also cause problems at the
other end of the age spectrum. For example, the behaviour of a father physically punishing a 15-year-old
daughter, or a mother her son, might be sufficiently degrading to contravene Article 3 of the European
Convention.81 Eventually the clause removing the defence from those chastising children under 3 years of
age was withdrawn from the Bill, thereby facilitating swift enactment of its remainder.82 Section 51 of the
Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003 retains the proposed limitations on the defence: a series of factors
which a court must have regard to when determining whether chastisement is reasonable and a list of
circumstances in which the defence is not applicable. The former83 reflects the judgment of the European
Court in A v UK. The latter specifies that a justifiable assault will not include a blow to the head, shaking or
the use of an implement.84
Admittedly the English courts, in reliance on section 3 of the HRA 1998 could equally well follow the new
Scottish approach. However, an anomalous situation has clearly been created, whereby Scotland has
enacted a compromise between abolition and recourse to the maturing common law. While not ensuring
compliance with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989, when taken in conjunction with the HRA
1998, it signifies a positive step towards securing compliance with the European Convention and
demonstrates a willingness to embrace the recommendations of the UN Committee on the Rights of the
Child and respond overtly to A v United Kingdom. England, on the other hand, seems to be content with a
fingers-crossed, wait-and-see attitude, 'delegating' discharge of its international duties to the courts and
juries. This contrast between the two legal jurisdictions is likely to be highlighted by the UN Committee on the
Rights of the Child. Perhaps more importantly, the Scottish Executive demonstrated that legislative change is
feasible and not political suicide. Despite the Bill being enacted shortly before the Scottish Parliament was
dissolved, the Labour party was returned to power in May 2003. Given that the UK is legally obliged to
disseminate reports of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,85 surely repeated public
condemnations by the UN, and potentially the European Court, could be as damaging to the government as
public disapproval.
Finally, international pressure will continue to grow. The maintenance of the reasonable chastisement
defence in Canada was recently upheld by a majority decision by the Supreme Court, although there were
strong dissenting opinions.86 As further countries elect to enact legislation severely curtailing the right of
parents to physically chastise their children, international human rights bodies will continue to promote
proscription as the only option guaranteeing respect for the dignity of the child.
VI Conclusions
Clearly the status quo is unsatisfactory in terms of pre-existing public international law. As noted above, the
risk of spurious prosecutions and the apparent lack of public support are not insurmountable. A
comprehensive education programme would pave the way for a change in the law. Alongside detailed
guidelines issued to the prosecuting authorities in a transparent process, opposition to changes in the law
might become more muted. The situation is ameliorated at present by the HRA 1998, and the provisions of
the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003 mentioned above. However, there are limits to the powers of the
courts and prosecuting authorities. Under the constitutional machinery of the UK, it is for Parliament and
Parliament alone to legislate for restrictions on, or abolition of, corporal punishment.87 Therein lies the real
problem. In reality, the major stumbling block encountered is government policy. As Fortin notes, the
'pusillanimous official approach continues to mar the government's present position on the use of physical
punishment on children'.88 Nothing in the Green Paper suggests an altered stance. In the current political
climate more emphatic measures seem ever less likely.
Children remain 'society's smallest and least powerful members',89 and inherently vulnerable. That the
greatest legitimate threat to their physical well-being comes from within the family unit, from their primary
carers, must surely be a matter for concern. Children certainly need protection but they also need discipline,
albeit within the limits prescribed by international and regional instruments. The international community
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requires that society gives children the best it has to give. Within England, the government response to date
falls considerably short of this.
VII Postscript
Prior to this article going to print, there were mounting calls for the Children Bill to contain a provision
reforming the law on the physical chastisement of children. These were heeded and Lord Lester's
amendment of the Bill was accepted in the House of Lords, in the form of clause 49. The clause provides
that for certain statutory offences, such as actual bodily harm, the battery of a child cannot be justified as
reasonable punishment. The clause's terms are opposed by many on the basis that by removing the legal
defence of 'reasonably chastisement' only in relation to certain forms of assault, English law will still condone
the physical punishment of children. Furthermore, the absence of any clear prohibition may send confused
messages about the state of the law to parents.
The Children Bill emerged from its second reading in the House of Lords in September 2004 with clause 49
intact. Shortly thereafter, the Joint Committee on Human Rights, published a critical report on the Bill's
compliance with human rights' norms (HL 161/HC 537). While the Committee acknowledged that the clause
is compatible with Convention rights (para 137), it highlights that the European Court is subtly evolving its
approach, thus eventually 'the continued availability of the defence of reasonable chastisement may be held
to be incompatible with Convention rights' (para 141). The Committee also stated that the clause is not
compatible with a contemporary application of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights or the European Social Charter. It concluded
by recommending amendment of the clause and abolition of the reasonable chastisement defence (paras
176-177). It remains to be seen whether the House of Commons will elect to bring children's rights in
England into line with international human rights.
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